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Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions
Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer
ABSTRACT
We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient 
facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes 
which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge’s attention. By focusing judicial at-
tention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can affect judicial 
decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence that bears on the 
psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy 
effects in choice of legal remedies, and framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model 
also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to legal formalism, judges deciding cases impartially verify 
facts and apply well-defined law to these facts, with no room left for pol-
icy considerations, extralegal norms, or biases. After all, the theory goes, 
judges are selected and trained to perform such formal analysis; they need 
to explain their opinions in writing, which disciplines thought; they are 
constrained by the adversarial system from missing relevant facts or rules; 
and they are kept on their toes by the risk of appellate review. In stark 
contrast to this perspective, legal realism holds that both trial and appel-
late judges enjoy significant discretion in deciding cases. Exercise of such 
discretion turns not just on the merits of the case but also on personal 
factors such as judges’ political views, beliefs about the litigants, or the 
lawyers’ persuasive tactics.
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One important strand of legal realism is rule skepticism, which em-
phasizes the discretion exercised by appellate courts in applying law to an 
established set of facts (Posner 2008; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013). 
Another strand, called fact skepticism, focuses on the discretion that trial 
courts exercise in establishing facts (Radin 1925; Frank 1930, 1949; Gen-
naioli and Shleifer 2008). Jerome Frank in particular stressed the impor-
tance of psychology for fact-finding, claiming that judges and juries are 
often mistaken, biased, or inattentive (Frank 1949). The role of psychol-
ogy in judicial decisions is again receiving some attention, especially in 
experimental research (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001; Kelman, 
Rottenstreich, and Tversky 1996; Viscusi 1999; Rachlinski, Wistrich, and 
Guthrie 2013). This research is based on the classic work of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), who identify a range 
of heuristics that decision makers use to make judgments and document 
biases that result from the use of such intuitive heuristics. We recently 
proposed salience theory to unify the existing evidence on heuristic deci-
sion making (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012, 2013). In this paper, 
we revisit experimental evidence on judicial biases from the perspective of 
this theory.
Salience theory builds on the premise that the valuation of a choice 
option occurs not in isolation but in a comparative context. Decision 
makers contrast the features of the option in question with the features 
of choice alternatives or of “normal” situations that come to the decision 
maker’s mind. For instance, the valuation of a premium good may fall if 
the good’s high price (rather than its high quality) is salient, as when the 
good is presented together with cheaper alternatives or when the decision 
maker is accustomed to buying the same good at lower prices. The cogni-
tive underpinning of salience theory is that human decisions are mediated 
by perception and attention. In evaluating a range of options, attention is 
drawn to unusual, extreme, or salient attributes of each option. Because 
they draw attention, salient attributes receive more weight in the deci-
sions than is justified by normative theory. Salience theory accounts for 
well-documented behavioral patterns such as the instability of risk pref-
erences (including preference reversals and Allais paradoxes) and more 
generally provides a novel and psychologically based account of context 
effects (such as decoy effects). By shaping what is perceived as normal 
and what is perceived as unusual or salient, context influences attention 
and decisions.
This logic seems useful to examine judicial behavior. After all, most 
judicial decision making is comparative. Judges compare the facts of the 
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present case with facts of similar cases, legal precedents, statutes, per-
sonal experiences or expectations in similar situations, and so on. The 
fact that judicial decisions are made in context is partly by design; prece-
dents are indeed supposed to anchor judicial decisions. At the same time, 
salience theory suggests that these anchors may focus judicial attention 
on peculiar aspects of the case that, although salient, may not be the most 
useful or relevant for the legal decision.
In this paper, we first summarize salience theory and then apply it to 
several experiments that bear on the psychology of judicial decisions. In 
particular, we consider anchoring mechanisms in the setting of damages, 
decoy effects affecting the choice among different legal remedies, and 
framing of payoffs in shaping the choice of settlement versus litigation. 
The key papers on which our analysis draws include Rachlinski (1996), 
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001), Kelman, Rottenstreich, and 
Tversky (1996), and Viscusi (1999, 2001). We show that salience theory 
provides a unified account of arguably disparate bits of evidence on judi-
cial decision making but also offers a new approach to positive analysis 
of damage awards in torts. In Section 4, we consider some implications 
of salience theory for such topics as legal evolution, legal procedure, and 
the stability of law.
2. SALIENCE THEORY
2.1. A Simple Example
We first illustrate the logic of salience in the context of attitudes toward 
risk. Consider the following experiments involving a choice between two 
risky prospects, or lotteries:
Experiment 1. Choose between the following two options:
 L L1
1
381
95
05
=




$
$
. ,
. ,
with probability 
with probability 2
20= {$ for sure.  (1)
Experiment 2. Choose between the following two options:
 L1
301
681
95
05
=




$
$
. ,
. ,
with probability
with probability
L2 320= {$ for sure.  (2)
In both experiments, the risky option L1 offers a small (5 percent) 
probability of a high payoff and a high (95 percent) probability of a $19 
loss relative to the sure outcome given by L2, but the two lotteries have 
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the same expected payoff. Experiment 2 simply adds $300 to all the pay-
offs in experiment 1.
A sample of 120 subjects participated in the two experiments (see Bor-
dalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012). In experiment 1, 83 percent of the 
subjects chose the safe option L2, while in experiment 2, 67 percent of the 
same subjects chose the risky lottery L1. Given that in each experiment 
the two options offer the same expected value, the same subjects exhibit 
risk aversion in the first experiment and are risk seeking in the second.
According to expected-utility theory, the stakes in either experiment 
are so low compared with lifetime wealth that people ought to be roughly 
risk neutral, choosing the risky lottery approximately 50 percent of the 
time. A small level of risk aversion would create stable preferences for the 
safe lottery L2 in both experiments. Salience theory, in contrast, predicts 
the observed pattern of risk aversion in experiment 1 and risk-seeking be-
havior in experiment 2.1 In experiment 1, the risky lottery L1’s downside 
of $1 feels very low relative to the sure payoff of $20. This bad outcome 
is salient, and subjects overweight it in their decision, which leads to risk-
averse behavior. In experiment 2, the risky lottery L1’s downside of $301 
looks fairly similar to the sure payoff of $320. The prospect of winning 
$681 is more salient, which leads to risk-seeking behavior.
As we show in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013), the same logic 
of comparative evaluation can be applied to riskless choice. To give an 
example, imagine yourself in a wine store, choosing a red wine. You con-
sider a French syrah from the Rhone Valley, selling for $20 a bottle, and 
an Australian shiraz selling for $10. You like French syrah better; you 
think it is perhaps 50 percent better. Yet it sells for twice as much. You 
decide that the Australian shiraz is a better bargain and buy a bottle.
A few weeks later, you are at a restaurant, and you see the same two 
wines on the wine list. Both of them are now marked up by $40, with the 
French syrah selling for $60 a bottle and the Australian shiraz for $50. 
You again think that the French wine is 50 percent better, but now it is 
only 20 percent percent more expensive. At the restaurant, it is a better 
deal. You splurge and order the French wine. Salience theory again pre-
1. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) holds that people overweight the 
small 5 percent probability of the high outcome, favoring risk-loving behavior in both ex-
periments. To obtain the reversal of risk attitudes in experiments 1 and 2, prospect theory 
requires a combination of probability weighting and decreasing absolute risk aversion in 
the value function, provided that the decision maker’s reference point is the status quo, no 
gains or losses. If instead the reference point is the sure gain, the two choice problems are 
identical, and prospect theory cannot account for the evidence. A systematic comparison 
of prospect and salience theory is presented in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012).
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dicts this reversal. At the store, the price difference between the cheaper 
and the more expensive wine is more salient than the quality difference, 
encouraging the consumer to opt for the cheaper option, whereas at the 
restaurant, after the markups, the quality difference is more salient, en-
couraging the consumer to splurge.
These examples illustrate how decision makers think in context when 
figuring out which of several choices represents a better deal in light of 
the options available. We next describe the salience model, formalizing 
the intuition behind such thinking.
2.2. The Model
A decision maker evaluates N > 1 alternatives in a choice context Ch = 
{(a1k, a2k)}k = 1, . . . , N , whose generic element is an option k identified by the 
vector of its two attributes a1k and a2k. Attributes are measured in dollars 
and are known to the decision maker. The choice context Ch contains the 
alternatives of choice but can in addition contain normal choice options 
that are usually considered by the decision maker but are not currently 
available or other options that are explicitly brought to the decision mak-
er’s attention.
This framework is sufficiently general to accommodate several appli-
cations. In choice under risk, the choice context Ch consists of different 
risky prospects with up to two different payoffs, in which case the attri-
butes describe prospects’ payoffs (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012; 
see also the framing example in Section 3). In riskless choice, the choice 
context consists of different consumer goods, in which case the attributes 
stand for quality and price (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013). In a 
litigation example, the choice context consists of the loss and damages 
from different decisions available to the judge (see Section 1).
A fully rational decision maker values option k according to the linear 
utility function
 u a a a ak k k k( )1 2 1 1 2 2, = + ,q q  (3)
where θ1, θ2 > 0, and weights add up to 1: θ1 + θ2 = 1. If the decision 
maker chooses among risky prospects, θ1 captures the probability of state 
1 and θ2 = 1 – θ1 the probability of state 2. If the decision maker chooses 
among consumer goods characterized by quality and price, then θ1 is the 
weight on quality qk, while θ2 is the weight on price pk (so that a1k = qk 
and a2k = –pk). We assume for simplicity that in this case θ1 = θ2 = 12 .
A salient thinker departs from equation (3) by inflating the relative 
weight attached to the attribute that he perceives to be more salient. An 
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attribute is salient for option k in the choice set Ch if this attribute stands 
out relative to the other attributes of the same option. Formally, denote by 
1 2( )a a,  the reference option consisting of average attributes Ni ka =å  aik /N 
in Ch. The salience of attribute i = 1, 2, for a generic option k is then 
given by ( )ik ia as , , where σ ( · , ·) is a salience function that satisfies the 
following properties:
Definition 1. The salience function σ ( · , ·) is symmetric and continu-
ous and satisfies the following:
1. Ordering. Let μ = sgn(aik – )ia .2 Then for any ε, e¢ ³  0 with ε + 
e¢> 0, we have
 σ µε µε σ( ) ( )a a a aik i ik i+ , − ′ > , .  (4)
2. Diminishing Sensitivity. For any aik, ia ³  0 and all ε > 0, we have
 σ ε ε σ( ) ( )a a a aik i ik i+ , + < , .  (5)
3. Reflection. For any aik, i ik ia a a¢ ¢, , ³ 0, we have
 s s s s( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a a a a a a a aik i ik i ik i ik i, > ′ , ′ ⇔ − , − > − ′ , − ′ .  (6)
For a given option k, its attribute 1 is salient when σ(a1k, 1a ) > σ(a2k, 
2a ), while its attribute 2 is salient when σ(a1k, 1a ) < σ(a2k, 2a ). Attributes 
1 and 2 are equally salient when σ(a1k, 1a ) = σ(a2k, 2a ).
Definition 1 encodes three key features of sensory perception. First, 
our perceptive apparatus is attuned to detect changes in stimuli. This is 
captured by ordering, which states that salience increases in contrast: op-
tion k’s value of attribute i, namely, aik, is more salient the further it is 
from the reference value ia  of that attribute. In the consumer-choice ex-
ample, if a consumer good is much cheaper than average, then its low 
price is very salient. In the risky-choice example, if in a given state of the 
world a risky lottery pays much more than all the other lotteries do, then 
that high payoff is salient for the lottery in question.
The second feature is that changes in stimuli are perceived with di-
minishing sensitivity.3 Formally, an attribute’s salience decreases as the 
value of that attribute increases uniformly for all options. For instance, 
at higher price (or payoff) levels, given price (or payoff) differences are 
2. When ik ia a= , the ordering condition of equation (4) holds for µ ± 1.
3. In the context of sensorial perception, this property is known as Weber’s law, after 
the 19th-century German physician Ernst Weber, who studied experimental psychology. 
For example, a given change in luminosity is perceived less intensely if it occurs at a higher 
luminosity level.
<SRJ: lc Gr epsilons in math look italic 
and don’t match those that have been de-
mathed.>
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less noticeable and thus less salient. The difference between $10 and $20 
looms larger than the difference between $110 and $120.
Third, our perceptive apparatus is sensitive to differences in magni-
tudes, or absolute values, so the impact of salience on positive and nega-
tive attributes is formally identical. In the case of consumer goods, qual-
ity and price are treated symmetrically. In the case of lotteries, we attend 
to unusually large positive and negative payoffs equally.
These features interact to determine the salience of each option’s at-
tributes, but they can also be in tension. For instance, in the consumer 
goods case, if price levels and price dispersion both increase, then dimin-
ishing sensitivity suggests that price salience decreases, while ordering 
suggests the opposite. Following Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013), 
we resolve this tension by assuming that the salience function is homoge-
neous of degree 0:
Assumption 0. The salience function satisfies ordering and homoge-
neity of degree 0, which is defined as σ(α × ai, α × ia ) = σ(ai, ia ) for all α 
≠ 0 and all ai, ia  ≠ 0.
Homogeneity of degree 0 characterizes salience in an intuitive way: an 
attribute’s salience increases with the proportional difference in the value 
of that attribute relative to the reference level.4 Together with ordering, 
homogeneity implies diminishing sensitivity and reflection of salience.
An example of a salience function satisfying homogeneity of degree 0 
is
 s( )a a a a
a aik i
ik i
ik i
, =
| − |
| | + | |
,  (7)
for aik, ia  ≠ 0, and σ (0, 0) = 0.
Consider how salience distorts the valuation of an option in the choice 
set. Given a salience function σ, the decision maker—we call him a salient 
thinker—ranks the salience of the option’s attributes and distorts their 
utility weights as follows:
Definition 2. The salient thinker’s valuation of option k enhances 
the relative weight attached to the salient attribute (while keeping the 
sum of utility weights constant). Formally,
4. In other words, on a variation in an option’s attribute aik, ordering dominates di-
minishing sensitivity if and only if the change in aik is proportionally larger than the in-
duced change in the reference ka .
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(8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] decreases in the severity of salient thinking.
When evaluating an option k, the salient thinker pays more attention 
to, and overweights, its salient attribute. If attribute 1 is salient, its rela-
tive utility weight increases from θ1 to θ1/(θ1 + δθ2) > θ1, while the relative 
weight of attribute 2 decreases from θ2 to δθ2/(θ1 + δθ2) < θ2. Conversely, 
if attribute 2 is salient, its relative utility weight increases to θ2/(θ2 + δθ1) > 
θ2, while the relative weight of attribute 1 decreases to δθ1/(θ2 + δθ1) < θ1. 
As δ → 0, the salient thinker considers only the most salient attribute and 
fully neglects the nonsalient attribute. If δ = 1, the salient thinker pays 
equal attention to both salient and nonsalient attributes, so his valuation 
is rational. Normalization of the utility weights ensures that valuation of 
the option (a1k , a2k) lies between a1k and a2k.
The salience model provides a novel and unified framework to explain 
a large set of anomalies in individual choice, both in a riskless setting 
(Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013) and in choice under risk (Bor-
dalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012). We now consider two examples of 
the impact of salience on choice, which will bear on our subsequent anal-
ysis of judicial decision making.
2.3. Payoff Salience and the Instability of Risk Attitudes
To illustrate the model, we now work through experiments 1 and 2 in 
Section 1. Each experiment compares a risky lottery to a sure prospect. 
The risky lottery’s downside occurs in state 1, with probability θ1 = .95, 
and its upside in state 2, with probability θ2 = .05. In experiment 1, the 
two options are L1 = (a11, a21) = (1, 381) and L2 = (a12, a22) = (20, 20). The 
reference payoffs are then given by 1 2( )a a,  = [(20 + 1)/2, (20 + 381)/2] = 
10.5, 200.5. The salience of L1’s downside is σ(a11, 1a ) = σ(10.5, 1), while 
the salience of its upside is σ(a21, 2a ) = σ(381, 200.5). The most salient 
payoff of L1 is its downside, because it exhibits a larger percentage dif-
ference from the relevant reference payoff, namely, 10.5/1 > 381/200.5.5
5. In greater detail, σ(a11, 1a ) = σ(1, 10.5), which equals σ(10.5, 1) by symmetry of the 
salience function. In turn, σ(381, 200.5) = σ(381/200.5, 1) because of homogeneity. Then 
ordering ensures that σ(10.5, 1) > σ(381/200.5, 1), because 10.5 > 381/200.5.
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Given this salience ranking, equation (8) implies that the lotteries are 
evaluated as
u L u LS S( ) , ( )1 2
95
95 05
1
05
95 05
381 20=
.
. + ×.
× +
×.
. + ×.
× = .
d
d
d
 (9)
In evaluating lottery L1, the salient thinker increases the weight attached 
to its salient downside of $1 and reduces the weight attached to its upside 
of $381. As a consequence, his evaluation of L1 falls below its expected 
value of 20. The valuation of the sure prospect L2 is instead unaffected by 
salience, because it yields the same payoff in all states. As a consequence, 
in experiment 1 the salient thinker is risk averse, choosing L2 over L1.
Consider the behavior of the salient thinker in experiment 2. The two 
options are L1 = (a11, a21) = (301, 681) and L2 = (a12, a22) = (320, 320), and 
the reference payoffs are 1 2( , )a a  = (310.5, 500.5). The salient payoff for 
L1 is its upside, because state 2 features a higher percentage payoff differ-
ence than state 1, namely, 681/500.5 > 310.5/301. The two options are 
now valued as
u L u LS S( ) , ( )1 2
95
95 05
301
05
95 05
681 320=
×.
×. + .
× +
.
×. + .
× = .
d
d d
In evaluating lottery L1, the salient thinker now increases the weight at-
tached to its salient upside $681 and reduces that of its downside $301, 
so that uS(L1) > 320. Like the experimental subjects, the salient thinker is 
now risk seeking and prefers L1 to L2.
From this analysis we distill the following psychological intuition 
for the reversal in risk attitudes. The choice between the two lotteries 
requires individuals to trade off—for given probabilities—the $19 loss 
against the $361 gain of the risky lottery. In standard theory, individu-
als evaluate this trade-off in absolute terms, making context-independent 
choices. Salience theory, in contrast, captures the psychological princi-
ple that individuals evaluate costs and benefits not in a vacuum but rel-
ative to the choice context they face. The $19 loss of the risky lottery 
looks much smaller (and thus nonsalient) when the payoff level is high, 
at $320, than when the payoff level is low, at $20. In contrast, the $361 
gain of the risky lottery looks quite large regardless of the payoff level. 
The shift in payoff levels changes the anchor to which lottery gains and 
losses are compared, which explains the shift from risk aversion in exper-
iment 1 to risk seeking in experiment 2.
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2.4. Wine and Decoys
Consider again the riskless choice between a French syrah and an Aus-
tralian shiraz. At the store, the French syrah has attributes (30, –20) and 
the Australian shiraz has attributes (20, –10), where attribute 1 captures 
quality while attribute 2 captures price (both measured in dollars). In the 
store the reference wine is 1 2( )a a,  = (25, –15). In this case, price is sa-
lient for both the French syrah (that is, 30/25 < 20/15) and the Australian 
shiraz (that is, 25/20 < 15/10). The salient thinker focuses on price and 
chooses the cheaper Australian wine. Formally, δ × 30 – 20 < δ × 20 – 
10.
At the restaurant, the French syrah has attributes (30, –60), while 
the Australian shiraz has attributes (20, –50). The reference wine at the 
restaurant is then 1 2( )a a,  = (25,  –55). Quality is now salient for both the 
French syrah (that is, 30/25 > 60/55) and the Australian shiraz (that is, 
25/20 > 55/50). The salient thinker focuses on quality and chooses the 
more expensive French wine. Formally, 30 – δ × 60 > 20 – δ × 50.
The role of comparative evaluation is clear: the extra $10 cost of 
the French syrah looks high when perceived in the context of low store 
prices, but it feels low when perceived in the context of high restaurant 
prices. As a consequence, the consumer is willing to pay $10 more to get 
higher quality at the restaurant but not at the store.
Comparative evaluation can also induce the so-called decoy effect, 
which has been well documented in psychology and marketing (Huber, 
Payne, and Puto 1982; Tversky and Simonson 1993): given a pairwise 
choice, adding an alternative dominated by one of the available options 
boosts the demand for the dominating option. This is at odds with stan-
dard theory, according to which the inclusion of irrelevant (in this case 
dominated) alternatives should not affect choice.
To see how this works, suppose that at the store a third, expensive 
wine d ≡ (30, –30) is added to the choice set. This wine has the same 
quality of the French syrah but a higher price. The inclusion of this op-
tion would not affect the preferences of a rational decision maker. Not so 
for a salient thinker. In the new choice set, the reference wine is 1 2( )a a,  
= [(30 + 30 + 20)/3], [(30 + 20 + 10)/3] = [80/3, –20]. Against this new 
reference good, the French syrah is now quality salient (that is, 30/(80/3) 
> 20/20), while the Australian shiraz continues to be price salient (that 
is, 20/(80/3) < 20/10). As a consequence, when the expensive decoy wine 
d is added, the salient thinker switches to choosing the expensive French 
wine. Formally, 30 – δ × 20 > 20 – 10.
Once again, this instability of preferences is due to comparative eval-
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uation. Without the decoy, the French wine is evaluated in comparison 
with the cheaper Australian wine. In this context, the consumer focuses 
on the fact that the French wine is more expensive, so it is perceived as 
a worse deal than the alternative. When the expensive decoy wine d is 
added to the choice set, the consumer compares the French wine with the 
decoy as well. In this context, the French wine is perceived to be a better 
deal, so the consumer focuses on its high quality and chooses it.
3. SALIENCE THEORY AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Judicial decision making is a promising field for applying salience the-
ory. Most judicial decisions involve the resolution of complex trade-offs. 
Judicial evaluation of specific situations does not occur in a vacuum and 
may be shaped by the litigants’ positions and the judge’s own experience, 
over and above the informational content of these inputs. A recent exper-
imental literature documents a variety of such contextual effects on legal 
decisions by jury-eligible persons as well as by judges (for example, Rach-
linski 1996; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001; Viscusi 1999, 2001; 
Kelman, Rottenstreich, and Tversky 1996). In this section, we show that 
the salience model provides a unified account of these disparate pieces of 
experimental evidence. This suggests that the logic of comparative evalu-
ation captured by salience theory may play an important role in judicial 
evaluation more generally.
A skeptic might object that experimental evidence sheds little light on 
actual courtroom decision making. Experiments are necessarily simple 
and fail to capture the complexity of actual cases. Judges in real-world 
cases care more about getting the right answer than they do when an-
swering experimental questions. They have the time and resources to get 
the information they need. Perhaps most important, judges are trained to 
cut through the forest of information and to focus on the legally relevant 
facts to which they can apply the law.
We do not find these objections compelling. If anything, the complex-
ity of actual courtroom experience would make judges more, rather than 
less, vulnerable to psychological biases than they are in streamlined ex-
periments. In the courtroom, judges are bombarded with material that 
draws their attention away from legally relevant facts, including the hu-
man aspects of the case, attorneys’ rhetoric, and the introduction of prec-
edents pulling in different directions. Judges are extremely busy and must 
devote enormous effort to keep straight all the facts and legal nuance 
under consideration. Rather than cut through the forest of irrelevant dis-
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agreements, judges may look for a clearing in the forest that lets the light 
shine through. Yet such a clearing is likely to be delivered precisely by the 
salient facts of the case, which stand out and draw judicial attention even 
when the salience of these facts is driven by legally irrelevant informa-
tion. The salient facts or precedents enable judges to form quick intuitive 
assessments as to who is right and to proceed to process further evidence 
through this lens. In balancing conflicting evidence, salience of particular 
facts can thus distort the judicial decision-making process, more so when 
the situation is more complex. In our view, then, the evidence from the 
relatively clean and straightforward experiments puts a lower bound on 
the influence of psychological factors on judicial decisions.
3.1. Irrelevant Information and the Setting of Damages
Judicial setting of monetary damages often involves a subjective compar-
ison of the loss incurred by the plaintiff and the cost imposed on the de-
fendant. By the comparative-evaluation principle, these subjective quanti-
fications can be influenced by bringing to a judge’s mind specific instances 
of compensation. The following experiments provide two concrete exam-
ples of this phenomenon.
3.1.1. Experiment 1. Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001) describe 
an experiment conducted with a subject pool of 167 federal magistrate 
judges, who were presented with the following case: “Suppose that you 
are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit that is in federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction. The defendant is a major company in the pack-
age delivery business. The plaintiff was badly injured after being struck 
by one of the defendant’s trucks when its brakes failed at a traffic light. 
Subsequent investigations revealed that the braking system on the truck 
was faulty, and that the truck had not been properly maintained by the 
defendant. The plaintiff was hospitalized for several months, and has 
been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his legs. He had been earn-
ing a good living as a free-lance electrician and had built up a steady base 
of loyal customers. The plaintiff has requested damages for lost wages, 
hospitalization and pain and suffering, but has not specified an amount. 
Both parties have waived their rights to a jury trial” (Guthrie, Rachlinski, 
and Wistrich 2001, p. 790). Judges were randomly assigned to either a 
No Anchor or an Anchor condition. Judges in the No Anchor group were 
asked, “How much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory dam-
ages?” Judges in the Anchor condition were also informed that “[t]he 
defendant has moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not 
meet the jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of $75,000.” These 
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judges had to rule on the motion, and then they were asked, “If you 
deny the motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in compen-
satory damages?” (p. 791). The additional information here constitutes 
a (normatively irrelevant) anchor on the grounds that the plaintiff had 
clearly incurred damages greater than $75,000. As a consequence, absent 
anchoring effects, judges should deny the motion to dismiss, and there 
should be no difference in the damages awarded by judges belonging to 
the No Anchor and to the Anchor treatments.
Consistent with the motion being meritless, only two (2.3 percent) of 
the judges in the Anchor group granted the motion to dismiss the case. 
At the same time, the 66 judges in the No Anchor condition indicated 
that they would award plaintiff an average of $1.25 million, while the 50 
judges in the Anchor condition awarded an average of $882,000. Asking 
the judges to rule on a frivolous motion depressed mean damage awards 
by more than $350,000 (or 29.4 percent) in this hypothetical case, which 
points to a very strong anchoring effect.
3.1.2. Experiment 2. Viscusi (2001, p. 118) describes an experiment con-
ducted with a subject pool of jury-eligible subjects, who were presented 
with the following case: “A major auto company with annual profits of 
$7 billion made a line of cars with a defective electrical system. This fail-
ure led to a series of fires in these vehicles that caused 4 burn deaths per 
year. Changing the design to prevent these deaths would cost $16 million 
for the 40,000 vehicles affected per year. This safety design change would 
raise the price of cars $400 each. The company thought there might be 
some risk from the current design but did not believe it would be signif-
icant. The company notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle had 
one of the best safety records in its class. The courts have awarded each 
of the victims’ families $800,000 in damages to compensate them for the 
income loss and pain and suffering that resulted. After these lawsuits, the 
company altered future designs to eliminate the problem.”
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups, which we call Pre-
cautions Considered and Precautions Not Considered. In both groups, 
subjects were asked to indicate whether the court should award punitive 
damages and, if so, how much. However, in the Precautions Considered 
group, subjects were further told that the auto company had performed a 
corporate risk analysis and decided against taking precautions and chang-
ing the design. Note that precautions are inefficient from an economic 
perspective: the $16 million cost to the company to fix the faulty system 
greatly exceeds the expected loss (expected number of fires times compen-
sation per fire), which was valued at roughly $3.2 million. Viscusi (2001) 
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highlights that, on these grounds, the additional information is irrelevant 
from the perspective of an efficient-precautions analysis.
In contrast to the efficient-precautions analysis, a large majority of 
subjects in either group would award punitive damages in this case. Cen-
tral to our argument, however, is the fact that subjects in the Precautions 
Considered group were more likely to award punitive damages (96 per-
cent versus 88 percent) and, conditional on this, awarded much higher 
damages: the median award more than tripled, from $1 million in the 
Precautions Not Considered group to $3.5 million in the Precautions 
Considered group.
The authors of the two studies interpret their results in light of dis-
tinct and specific mechanisms of decision making. To explain the effect 
of bringing the motion to dismiss to the judges’ attention, Guthrie, Rach-
linski, and Wistrich (2001) suggest that being exposed to the motion may 
have caused the judges to consider the possibility that the true damages in 
this case were exceptionally low, so their resolution of the uncertainty as-
sociated with the loss results in comparatively low damage estimates. To 
explain the effect of reminding judges about the failed possibility of tak-
ing precautions, Viscusi attributes the exceptionally high punitive dam-
ages to the subjects’ outrage at the company’s actions and to their wish 
to send a signal to the company that “human life is more important than 
profits” (Viscusi 2001, p. 118).6
While these case-specific mechanisms have merit, we argue that both 
examples are also fully consistent with the common mechanism of com-
parative evaluation. Before the formal analysis, we briefly describe its 
logic. After reading the damage case, the judge (or juror) comes up with 
an assessment of the plaintiff’s loss. If this loss is salient in the context of 
the case, the judge sets high damages (potentially above the assessment) 
to reflect its perceived severity. If in contrast the loss is not salient, the 
judge sets lower damages (potentially below the assessment) to avoid an 
unfairly high penalty on the defendant. Consider the Guthrie, Rachlinski, 
and Wistrich (2001) experiment: when the motion to dismiss suggests 
that the plaintiff’s severe injuries could be compensated with $75,000 or 
less, any reasonable damage figure (which is necessarily much higher than 
$75,000) is salient and more likely to stand out relative to the assessed 
loss. As a consequence, judges select lower damages in the Anchor group 
6. To determine what drives his results, Viscusi varies the level of risk and the cost per 
life saved in his hypothetical cases. These variables are not significantly associated with 
the damages awarded, which leads to the conclusion that “[a]ll that matters is whether 
the company performed a risk analysis in advance” (Viscusi 2001, p. 123).
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than in the No Anchor group. In the Viscusi (2001) experiment, when the 
jurors are reminded that no loss would have occurred had precautions 
been taken, a course of action the company contemplated and ultimately 
rejected, any estimated loss becomes more salient relative to the low cost 
to the company of avoiding it (regardless of efficiency considerations). As 
a consequence, jurors award higher damages in the Precautions Consid-
ered group than in the Precautions Not Considered group.7
Salience theory offers a formal account of the judge’s decision-making 
process. In setting damages, he evaluates a trade-off between two dimen-
sions: an assessment of the plaintiff’s loss L (dimension 1) and the cost 
C to the defendant (dimension 2) of precautions or damage payments in 
court. A loss-cost package is then captured by the vector (–L, C).
A judge wants to set compensation so as to make the plaintiff whole, 
namely, so that the plaintiff is indifferent between having his loss com-
pensated and having suffered no loss at all. Formally, the judge calculates 
the plaintiff’s willingness to accept bearing the loss L, WTA(L), which 
denotes the minimum amount of money C the plaintiff is willing to ac-
cept in order to choose (–L, C) over the status quo in which no injuries 
are sustained and, correspondingly, no damages are received from the de-
fendant. A rational judge sets
WTA subject to( ) min{ ( ) ( )},L C u C L u= − ≥ 0
where u(·) is given by equation (3). Assume that the utility of the plain-
tiff is proportional to C – L, assigning equal weights ( 11 2 2q q= = ) to 
damages and loss, both expressed in dollars. Then the rational judge sets 
WTA(L) = L, irrespective of the provision of meritless motions or of in-
formation about precautions.
In contrast, the salient thinker includes other information—such as 
the possibility of dismissing the first case or the expectation that precau-
tions are taken in the second case—in the case’s context. This context Ch 
includes the plaintiff’s hypothetical choice options that are required to 
evaluate his compensation, namely, the actual loss-cost package (–L, C) 
and the status quo (0, 0), but it also includes any specific loss-cost pack-
age ( )L C- ,   that is brought to the judge’s attention. In this formalism, 
7. Although Viscusi’s experiment pertains to punitive damages, we argue for inter-
preting the damage awards as compensation for the victims’ loss. When jurors were given 
different estimates of the value of life, they adjusted the level of damages proportionately 
(which would not be warranted under a deterrence view of punitive damages), which 
supports this interpretation. Similarly, the assessed damages are broadly insensitive to the 
probability of injury or the cost of precautions.
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the motion to dismiss corresponds to the loss-cost package L  = L, C  = 
$75,000, while the auto company precaution corresponds to the package 
L  = 0, C  = $16 million. The willingness to accept computed by the salient- 
thinking judge in context Ch is then given by
WTA subject toS S S( | ) min{ ( | ) ( , | )},L C u C L uCh Ch Ch= − ≥ 0 0
where uS(·) is now given by equation (8). The judge still calculates the 
minimum damages C to be paid by the defendant such that the plaintiff 
chooses (–L, C) over (0, 0), but the superscript S now indicates that the 
judge’s trade-off between losses to the plaintiff and costs to the defendant 
is shaped by salience. In line with equation (8), when the loss is salient, 
the judge overweights it in the plaintiff’s utility function and sets a higher 
WTA. When instead damages are salient, the judge overweights the bene-
fit of receiving damages in the plaintiff’s utility function and sets a lower 
WTA. Critically, whether the plaintiff’s loss L or a given cost C is salient 
depends on which loss-cost package ( )L C- ,   the judge is reminded of.
Consider first the baseline No Anchor and Precautions Not Consid-
ered conditions, in which no information on the motion to dismiss or 
on precautions considered by the company is provided. In this case, the 
choice context is simply Ch = {(–L, C), (0, 0)}. The reference loss in this 
context is L/2, and the reference damage cost is C/2. In this case, for any 
chosen level of damages C, losses and damages are equally salient because
1
1
2 2 2
L C
L Cs s s
æ ö æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç, = , = , ,÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç çè ø è ø è ø
which holds by homogeneity of degree 0. This implies the following:
Lemma 1. In the baseline experiments (No Anchor and Precautions Not 
Considered), salient-thinking judges set the rational damages C = L.
(All proofs are in the Appendix.) As implied by equation (8), when dam-
ages and losses are equally salient, judicial valuation is not distorted and 
satisfies the strict-liability principle.
Consider now the case in which the choice context is Ch = {(–L, C), 
(0, 0), ( )L C- ,  }, where ( )L C- ,   is a generic loss-cost package the judge 
is reminded of. This could be one of the experimental treatments above 
(motion to dismiss or information about precautions), or more generally 
it could be a precedent-setting damage award in a related case. In this 
context, the reference loss is (L + L)/3, while the reference damage is (C 
+ C)/3. Thus, the plaintiff’s loss L is more salient than a chosen level C of 
damages imposed on the defendant if and only if
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In the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the case in which L  < 2L 
and C  < 2C (which both hold in the examples in question). In this case, it 
is immediate to show that the plaintiff’s loss is salient if and only if
 C C
L L
< ,


 (10)
namely, whenever the ratio of the company’s cost in terms of damages C 
relative to the plaintiff’s assessed loss L is lower than the corresponding 
ratio in the anchor scenario ( )L C- ,  . Instead, the company’s cost is salient 
when damages C are high (relative to the loss) compared with those in the 
anchor scenario ( )L C- ,  .
This mechanism has far-reaching implications. When reminded of a 
stingy compensation package (small /C L ) per unit of loss, the judge views 
even very small damages as salient, which reduces the judge’s assessed 
WTA. When reminded of the possibility of avoiding the plaintiff’s losses 
altogether (large /C L ), the loss incurred by the plaintiff is salient, which 
boosts the judge’s WTA. More generally, judges set damages as follows:
Proposition 1. When the anchor ( )L C- ,   is provided, the salient 
thinker sets damages
 WTA
if
if
if
s =
×
/
/ ×
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< / < /
/ > /


d
d
d
d d
d
L
C L
L
C L
C L
C L
 
 
 
 1
1
1
,
,
.



 (11)
In rough terms, we find that the salient-thinking judge targets the 
share of the compensated loss C/L to the ratio /C L  prevailing in the com-
parative situation. In this sense, /C L  truly provides an anchor for setting 
compensation. When C/L is above the anchor /C L , the cost imposed on 
the defendant is the salient attribute of the case, which tends to induce 
the judge to reduce C. When C/L is below the anchor /C L , the plaintiff’s 
loss is the salient attribute of the case, which tends to induce the judge to 
increase C. This mechanism implies that if in the comparative situation 
the company bears a small cost /C L  < 1, the presence of the anchor re-
duces damages below the initial assessment of the loss L. When instead 
in the comparative situation the plaintiff bears a small loss /C L  > 1, the 
anchor boosts damages above the initial assessment of the actual loss L. 
Because the costs imposed on the company tend to be set in the same pro-
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portion to the loss as that in the anchor, proposition 1 might be called a 
model of comparative proportionality of damages.
At this point we revisit the two experiments. The motion to dismiss in 
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001) provides an anchor where L = 
L and C  = $75,000. The ratio /C L  is equal to C/L, which makes any com-
pensation C above C  = $75,000 salient. According to equation (11), this 
depresses the awarded level of damages, consistent with the experimental 
findings. The consideration of precautions in Viscusi’s (2001) experiment 
provides an anchor where L = 0 and C  = $16 million. Here the ratio /C L  
is extremely high, making losses salient for any positive damage C. This 
implies, by equation (11), that the awarded damages are increased, which 
is also consistent with the experimental findings.8
The intuition for these results is clear. When adjusting damages 
around an assessment of losses, the judge faces the difficult task of trad-
ing off the nonmonetary loss incurred by the plaintiff and the monetary 
cost imposed on the defendant. The principle of comparative evaluation 
implies that the presence of an anchor for costs affects how this trade-
off is resolved. Making judges think about precedents in which sizeable 
losses receive no or little compensation induces them to view even fairly 
low damages as generous, which reduces their own estimate of a fair 
compensation. Making judges think about precedents in which compen-
sation was generous, or about counterfactuals that make the losses more 
salient, induces them to view fairly high damages as stingy, which thus 
increases their compensation recommendations.9
8. Of course, it is not always possible for judges to exactly match /C L . In particular, 
when the anchor provides very little compensation, ( /C L ) < δ—the case of the experiment 
in Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001)—damages are salient but the judge still needs 
to compensate the nonsalient loss δ × L. The fact that the plaintiff’s loss is nonsalient, 
however, implies that damages are set below the assessment L. Matching the anchor is 
also not possible when it assigns a very high cost to the defendant per unit loss of the 
plaintiff—the case of Viscusi’s (2001) experiment. In this case, matching the ratio /C L  
when losses do occur would require the judge to impose arbitrarily high damages on the 
defendant. Instead, the judge limits the damages to be commensurate with the salient loss 
of (1/δ) × L. The fact that the plaintiff’s loss is now salient then implies that compensa-
tion is above the initial assessment L.
9. In the context of riskless consumer choice, this finding parallels the famous beer ex-
periment proposed by Thaler (1985, 1999). Subjects are told to imagine sunbathing with 
a friend on a beach in Mexico. It is hot, and the friend offers to get an ice-cold Corona 
from the nearest seller, 100 yards away, to be brought back and consumed on the beach. 
Subjects are asked for their reservation price. In the first treatment, the nearest place to 
buy the beer is a beach resort. In the second treatment, the nearest place is a corner store. 
Many subjects would pay more for a beer from a resort than for one from the store, 
which contradicts the fundamental assumption that willingness to pay for a good is inde-
pendent of context. As we show in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013), the salience 
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This discussion illustrates how the anchoring mechanism may be per-
vasive in legal decision making. Anchors can most naturally be formed 
by precedents, in which case salience provides a force of conformity to 
precedent preserving the stability of the law. But anchors can also arise 
from irrelevant information, as illustrated in Guthrie, Rachlinski, and 
Wistrich’s (2001) experiment, or from judges’ expectations about, or 
counterfactuals to, the facts of the case, as illustrated in Viscusi’s (2001) 
experiment.
3.2. Legal Decoys
The logic of Section 3.1 has further implications for areas of law in which 
parties must choose between several courses of action. This is illustrated 
by the following hypothetical legal counseling case proposed by Kelman, 
Rottenstreich, and Tversky (1996) to undergraduate students at Stanford 
University:
The Economics Department of a major university voted, two years ago, to rec-
ommend that your client, then an Associate Professor at the University, not be 
promoted to a tenured position. She claims that she was discriminated against 
on account of her gender. . . . Your client is interested in (1) being compensated 
for wrongs done to her and in (2) having the University publicly admit guilt in 
her case. At the same time, your client is very interested in the progress of women 
generally and wants (3) to do her part to push for affirmative action plans that 
would help women in Economics. . . . The University counsel’s office has con-
tacted you and asked you to communicate settlement offers to your client. (p. 
298)
Subjects had to advise their client on which settlement offer to ac-
cept. One group of subjects had to choose between two settlement offers 
(choice context 1). The first offer bound the university to an affirmative 
action plan for the economics department without admitting guilt or pay-
ing damages. The second offer consisted of a public admission of guilt 
and $45,000 in damages. Another group of subjects (choice context 2) 
had to choose among the two offers plus a third offer consisting of a 
public admission of guilt plus a donation of $35,000 in the client’s name 
to her favorite charity. Note that the third offer is clearly inferior to the 
second offer, because the plaintiff could always accept the $45,000 dam-
model explains the Thaler (1985, 1999) experiment through a mechanism similar to the 
one illustrated here. Because the salient thinker expects a high price for beer at the resort, 
he is willing to pay a higher price and still perceive the beer to be a good deal (salient 
quality). In contrast, at the store, where beer is expected to be cheap, a high price would 
be very salient, and the salient thinker is unwilling to pay it.
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ages of the second offer, give $35,000 to charity, and keep $10,000 for 
herself.
The behavior of rational subjects should be the same in both choice 
contexts. This is because the third settlement offer is dominated by the 
second (and is thus irrelevant). In the experiment, however, behavior 
changed markedly from choice context 1 to choice context 2: while only 
50 percent of subjects chose the second settlement offer in choice context 
1, 76 percent of the subjects chose the second settlement offer in choice 
context 2, when the third offer was included. In line with the decoy ef-
fect, the introduction of a dominated settlement offer increased the valua-
tion of the dominating offer.
The decoy logic in Section 2.4 illustrates how salience accounts for this 
effect: the presence of the dominated third offer, with its lower monetary 
compensation, increases the salience of the dominating option’s higher 
monetary compensation and thus boosts the latter’s valuation. Formally, 
suppose that the plaintiff values two broad categories of compensatory 
measures: nonmonetary and monetary. Nonmonetary measures include 
the university’s public admission of guilt and/or its pursuit of an affirma-
tive action plan. Denote by g the defendant’s dollar value of a public ad-
mission of guilt and by G the value of an affirmative action plan. Mone-
tary measures obviously consist of damages, part of which may be valued 
less than free cash if earmarked for a specific use (charity in this case). 
Suppose that the defendant discounts each dollar earmarked for charity 
by φ ≤ 1.10 The three settlement offers are then described by
1 2 2 3 3( 0) ( ) ( )S G S g D S g Df= , , = , , = , ´ ,
where attribute 1 captures nonmonetary benefits, attribute 2 captures 
monetary benefits, D2 = $45,000, and D3 = $35,000.
If the plaintiff’s utility function has θ1 = θ2 = 12  in equation (3), she 
computes the overall utility of an offer by simply adding monetary and 
nonmonetary attributes. In contrast, the salient thinker attaches a higher 
weight to the offer’s salient dimension, be it its monetary or nonmonetary 
component. For simplicity, assume that the plaintiff values the university- 
wide affirmative action more than the admission of guilt, G > g, and that 
the plaintiff is not willing to pay $45,000 out of her pocket for an admis-
sion of guilt by the university, g < D2. These assumptions are reasonable 
and have two implications. First, S1 is the best offer from the viewpoint 
of nonmonetary compensation and the worst offer from the viewpoint of 
10. When φ = 1, the plaintiff would individually implement the same, or higher, char-
ity donation of the settlement offer.
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monetary compensation. Second, the valuation of S2 is higher if the dam-
ages it entails, rather than nonmonetary compensation, are salient.
Consider the behavior of the salient thinkers. In choice context 1, 
which compares offers S1 and S2, the reference nonmonetary compensa-
tion is (G + g)/2, while the reference level of damages is D2/2. The salient 
attribute for offer S1 is its total lack of damages, because σ(0, D2/2) > 
σ[G, (G + g)/2] by homogeneity of degree 0. The salient attribute for of-
fer S2 is its higher damages when
 2 2( 2) (2 1) ( ( ) 2) (( ) 2 1)D D g G g G g gs s s s, / = , > , + / = + / , ,  (12)
which is satisfied if and only if G < 3g. If S2’s damages are salient, its eval-
uation increases (because high damages are the offer’s best attribute, D2 > 
g), so S2 is more likely to be chosen over S1.11
Consider now the problem faced by subjects in choice context 2, when 
the decoy offer S3 = (g, φ × D3) is added to the choice set. Now, when 
choosing between S2 and S2, the salient thinker evaluates these offers in 
light of the reference attribute values [(G + 2g)/3, (D2 + φD3)/3]. The 
salient attribute for offer S1 continues to be its total lack of damages (be-
cause of homogeneity of degree 0), so its valuation is the same in both 
contexts. Intuitively, the fact that S1 is the only option paying no damages 
remains the distinguishing feature of this offer. On the other hand, the 
salient attribute of S2 is its monetary compensation if and only if σ[D2, 
(D2 + φD3)/3] > [g, (G + 2G)/3], which is satisfied if and only if G < g × 
[(7D2 – 2φD3)/( D2 + φD3)]. Comparing this condition to equation (12) 
leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The set of conditions under which offer S2 is chosen is 
strictly weaker in choice context 2 than in choice context 1 if and only if 
D2/D3 > 5/4 × φ.
The introduction of the dominated offer S3 increases the appeal of the 
dominating offer S2 provided that the damages paid by S2 are sufficiently 
high relative to those paid by S3. The intuition is straightforward: when S3 
fares much worse than S2 in term of damages, the relatively high damages 
of S2 become salient, which thereby boosts its valuation. It is easy to see 
that the condition in proposition 2 is met by the experiment’s monetary 
values D2 = $45,000 and D3 = $35,000.
11. Formally, if G < 3g, monetary compensation is salient for both S1 and S2, so S2 is 
chosen if and only if δ × g + D2 > δ × G. If instead G > 3g, monetary compensation is 
salient for S1 and nonmonetary compensation is salient for S2, so S2 is chosen if and only if 
g + δD2 > δ × G, which is a stronger condition.
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As with the anchoring effect in Section 1, the principle underlying 
the model’s account of decoy effects in settlement offers is that of com-
parative evaluation. When solving a complex problem such as choosing 
among multidimensional offers, individuals do not harness their own ab-
solute metric for monetary and nonmonetary compensation and apply it 
to the offers at hand. Rather, they evaluate different policies in context by 
comparing their different features and by focusing on each offer’s most 
distinguishing aspect. When an inferior offer is added, the advantage of 
the dominating offer becomes salient, which increases its valuation.
3.3. Framing of Risky Prospects
We conclude our analysis by considering the role of salience in shaping 
risk attitudes in the legal context. It is well known that individuals’ risk 
preferences depend on whether payoffs are framed in terms of gains or 
losses, even though such frames are normatively irrelevant (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Rachlinski (1996) investigates this issue in a domain 
in which risk preferences are central to judicial process, namely, the de-
cision of whether to settle or litigate. A simple litigation problem was 
presented to law students, half of whom played the role of counsel to the 
plaintiff and half the role of counsel to the defendant. Subjects had to ad-
vise their client on whether to settle or litigate. In particular, “[p]laintiff- 
subjects had to choose between a certain $200,000 settlement offer and 
a 50% chance of winning $400,000 at trial (and a corresponding 50% 
chance of winning nothing). Defendant-subjects had to choose between 
paying a $200,000 settlement offer and facing a 50% chance of losing 
$400,000 at trial with a corresponding 50% chance of losing nothing” 
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001, p. 795). Rachlinski found that 
77 percent of plaintiff-subjects advised settling but that only 31 percent 
of defendant-subjects advised settling. Plaintiff-subjects were risk averse; 
defendant-subjects, were risk seeking.
This behavior is inconsistent with expected-utility theory. Both plaintiff- 
and defendant-subjects choose between a safe amount and a mean- 
preserving spread around it. Under common risk preferences, plaintiffs 
and defendants should both prefer to settle (if risk averse) or to litigate (if 
risk seeking). The conventional explanation for the observed instability 
of risk preferences relies on prospect theory’s S-shaped value function, 
which is assumed to be concave for gains and convex for losses. This in-
duces risk aversion for plaintiffs (who choose between a sure gain and a 
risky gain) and risk seeking for defendants (who choose between a sure 
loss and a risky loss).
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Salience theory can explain this instability of risk attitudes as a con-
sequence of context dependence: changing the framing from gains to 
losses changes the lottery outcome perceived to be salient, which thereby 
changes risk preferences.12 Salience thus allows us to provide a novel uni-
fied psychological explanation for framing, anchoring, and decoy effects.
To see how the salience model can generate framing effects, consider 
the choice faced by plaintiff-subjects in Rachlinski’s experiment. The 
risky litigation has two possible outcomes: the plaintiff loses the litigation 
in state 1 and wins in state 2, and each state occurs with probability θ1 = 
θ2 = .5. In terms of its payoffs in the two states of the world, the litigation 
option is given by R = (0, 400) (to streamline notation, we write the pay-
offs in units of thousands of dollars). In turn, the settlement option gives 
the same payoff in both states, S = (200, 200). When comparing the two 
options, the reference payoff in state 1 is 1a  = (0 + 200)/2 = 100, and that 
in state 2 is 2a  = (400 + 200)/2 = 300. The salient outcome for litigation 
is then loss state 1 because σ(0, 100) > σ(400, 300), because of the dimin-
ishing sensitivity property of salience in equation (5). Intuitively, when a 
sure $200 is in hand, the risk of ending up with nothing is more salient 
than the possibility of gaining $400. Because the downside is salient, lit-
igation is valued less than its expected value of $200 (as in experiment 1 
in Section 3). As a consequence, plaintiff-subjects prefer settlement to liti-
gation, exhibiting risk averse behavior.
Consider now the choice faced by defendant-subjects. In this frame, 
the available options are a sure loss coming from a settlement S = (–200, 
–200) and a risky litigation R = (0, –400), where—consistent with the 
convention above—in state 1 the defendant wins and the plaintiff loses. 
As before, θ1 = θ2 = .5. From the defendant-subjects’ perspective, the ref-
erence payoffs are 1a  = (0 – 200)/2 = –100 and 2a  = (–400 – 200)/2 = 
–300. The salient outcome of litigation is now the winning state 1 be-
cause σ(0, –100) > σ(–400, –200), because of diminishing sensitivity and 
reflection (equation [6]). When compared with a sure loss of $200, the 
possibility of nullifying that loss is more salient than the risk of losing 
$400. Because the litigation’s upside is salient, litigation is valued above 
its expected value of –$200. As a consequence, defendant-subjects prefer 
litigation to settlement, exhibiting risk-seeking behavior.
12. In other settings, both plaintiffs and defendants stand to gain from the litigation 
process, as, for example, in copyright-sharing decisions. When all payoffs are positive, a 
salient thinker may still shift from risk-seeking to risk-averse behavior depending on the 
framing of the gains, as in the example in Section 3. As we explained there, this behavior 
is incompatible with prospect theory.
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Changing how payoffs are framed, from the gain to the loss domain, 
alters risk preferences by changing the nature of the salient outcome. In 
the gain domain, the downside risk of losing nothing is salient, while in 
the loss domain the upside risk of getting nothing is salient. Given that the 
problem faced by defendants simply subtracts $400,000 from the problem 
faced by plaintiffs, the framing effect shown here has the same nature of 
the context-dependent shift in risk attitudes discussed in Section 3.
Even though this experiment involves legal counseling of plaintiffs or 
defendants, the same effects are likely to apply to the judiciary, given that 
judges often play an active role in supervising settlement talks. Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001) design an experiment with 167 federal 
magistrate judges, which also documents a shift in pro-litigation attitudes 
as the problem is reframed from gains to losses. But the issue is broader, 
as many judicial decisions involve choice among risky prospects. For ex-
ample, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2001) document that judges 
are more likely to vote for a risky reorganization plan when creditors’ 
payoffs are framed as losses rather than as gains.
4. CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions of necessity must balance various aspects of a case 
ranging from the severity of misconduct and damages to the nature of 
the penalties. The process of reaching such balance or proportionality is 
vulnerable to the influence of salience, the idea that certain aspects of the 
case stand out in judges’ attention and as a consequence influence judicial 
decisions. Of course, there are many legal mechanisms that try to limit 
salience or other psychological influences, most importantly precedents. 
The subtle point here, however, is that via the mechanism of comparative 
evaluation, these very mechanisms can shape judicial decision making 
over and above their original intent. Indeed, the experimental evidence 
suggests (but does not prove) that salience can induce even experienced 
judges to extrapolate too much from past cases or counterfactual scenar-
ios, which distorts standard legal reasoning.
We have illustrated our approach using the analysis of experimental 
evidence, but here we consider some broader implications of our frame-
work. In many situations, past cases anchor judicial decisions. This may 
explain why lawyers spend so much time relating the facts of the case to 
their favored precedents. But salience may also render judicial decisions 
inconsistent across cases, especially when driven by salient but legally 
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irrelevant facts. Plaintiffs or defendants might be conspicuously unap-
pealing individuals, which prompts the court to find ways to rule against 
them. The plaintiff might have suffered extreme harm with no evidence 
of negligence, which encourages courts to nonetheless find responsibility 
so that harm is not so salient relative to compensation. Such hard cases 
draw judicial attention to the features that should perhaps matter little 
but end up mattering more.
A side benefit of salient thinking is that it encourages legal evolution, 
which usually takes the form of distinguishing cases from precedents (see, 
for example, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007). Cases that differ from prece-
dents along a salient dimension are likely to be those in which precedent 
leads to decisions whose unfairness or disproportionality if current law is 
applied stands out. The evolution of exceptions to the economic loss rule, 
described by Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer (2010), has some of that char-
acter. Of course, salience can also encourage distinguishing on the basis 
of legally irrelevant features of the case and not just on efficient legal evo-
lution. To the extent that they shape the salience of the facts, cases that 
come to the judge’s mind take on great significance (Radin 1925).
It should not be surprising that legal procedure has evolved to con-
strain the influence of salience and other cognitive biases. The rules of 
evidence control what is presented to judges and juries, and an elaborate 
body of law has developed to exclude information that might be prejudi-
cial. The legal system seems highly conscious of the influence of salience; 
we doubt, however, that this influence is wholly eliminated.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1
In the No Anchor condition, the choice set is Ch = (–L, C), (0, 0). In this context, 
the reference loss is L/2 and the reference damage cost is C/2. Homogeneity of 
degree 0 of the salience function then implies σ(L, L/2) = σ(1, 12 ) = σ(C, C/2), so 
for any chosen level of damages C, losses and damages are equally salient. As a 
consequence, uS(C – L|Ch) = (C – L)/2, while uS[(0, 0)|Ch] = 0. Then WTAS equals 
inf{C subject to C – L ≥ 0} = L. Therefore, the salient-thinking judge sets the ratio-
nal level of damages C = L.
Proof of Proposition 1
The reference loss level in Ch = {(0, 0), (–L, C), (–L , C)} is L = (L + L)/3, while 
the reference level of damages is C = (C + C)/3. Thus, the salience of losses and 
damages of option (–L, C) are, respectively,
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Recall from the text the assumption L  < 2L and C  < 2C (which holds in the exam-
ples). It follows that losses are salient when
 C C
L L
>


. (A1)
Note that as C varies in the range (C × 12 , C× L/L), it can take values larger or 
smaller than the reference damage C .
Recall the definition of willingness to pay:
WTA subject toS S S= − ≥min{ ( | ) ( , | )},C u C L uCh Ch0 0
Consider first the case in which the awarded damages are salient, so they fully com-
pensate for losses when C = δL. This compensation is indeed salient when C L/  > 
C/L. Thus, WTP = δL whenever C L/  < δ.
Consider now the case in which C L/  > δ. If the damages are set at C < L × C L/ , 
then the loss would be salient, so the damages can be increased until L/δ as long as 
the salience ranking does not change: WTA = min{L × 1/δ, L × C L/ }. Therefore, 
WTP = L × C L/  for C L/  < 1/δ and WTP = L/δ for C L/  > 1/δ (and C  < 2C; namely, 
C2/δ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Because the valuation of offer S1 is constant in both contexts, the inclusion of the 
decoy offer (g, φ × D3) relaxes the conditions under which S2 is chosen if and 
only if it relaxes the condition that S2’s upside—its monetary compensation, or 
damages—is salient. In context 1, S2’s damages are salient if and only if G < 3g. In 
context 2 (with the decoy), S2’s damages are salient if and only if G < g × (7D2 – 
2φD3)/(D2 + φD3). Thus, the decoy makes it more likely for S2 to be chosen if and 
only if g × (7D2 – 2φD3)/(D2 + φD3) > 3g; namely, D2/D3 > 5/4 × φ.
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